Postgraduate Course: Game Theory (MATH11090)
Course Outline
| School | School of Mathematics |
College | College of Science and Engineering |
| Course type | Standard |
Availability | Not available to visiting students |
| Credit level (Normal year taken) | SCQF Level 11 (Postgraduate) |
Credits | 5 |
| Home subject area | Mathematics |
Other subject area | None |
| Course website |
None |
Taught in Gaelic? | No |
| Course description | Worst-case analysis, robust solutions, saddle points, mixed and pure Nash equilibria for matrix games, dominant strategies. Two-person zero-sum games: minimax and maximin, LP duality. Nash-Cournot equilibria, single commodity market and production and price in Monopoly, Oligopoly and Perfect Competition situations. Stability of equilibria. Continuous evolution. Payoff region, independent strategy region, cooperative region, Pareto optimal region. Repeated games: Brown's method, Nash equilibria. Grim and Tit-for-Tat strategies. Folk theorem. Transferable or non-transferable payoffs. Coalition stability, core of an n-player game. Fisher's equilibrium argument. |
Entry Requirements (not applicable to Visiting Students)
| Pre-requisites |
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Co-requisites | |
| Prohibited Combinations | |
Other requirements | None |
| Additional Costs | None |
Course Delivery Information
| Not being delivered |
Summary of Intended Learning Outcomes
| Understanding of basic game solution concepts. Ability to compute Nash equilibria of two-person zero-sum games by linear programming. Ability to analyse strategic problems in competitive commercial situations. |
Assessment Information
| Continuous Assessment 15%; Examination 85% |
Special Arrangements
| None |
Additional Information
| Academic description |
Not entered |
| Syllabus |
Not entered |
| Transferable skills |
Not entered |
| Reading list |
Not entered |
| Study Abroad |
Not entered |
| Study Pattern |
Not entered |
| Keywords | GT |
Contacts
| Course organiser | Dr Julian Hall
Tel: (0131 6)50 5075
Email: |
Course secretary | Mrs Frances Reid
Tel: (0131 6)50 4883
Email: |
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