Undergraduate Course: Philosophy of Risk (PHIL10219)
Course Outline
School | School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences |
College | College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences |
Credit level (Normal year taken) | SCQF Level 10 (Year 4 Undergraduate) |
Availability | Available to all students |
SCQF Credits | 20 |
ECTS Credits | 10 |
Summary | The notion of risk is central to areas such as economics, finance, medicine and law as well as branches of philosophy such as ethics and epistemology. It is also a prominent part of ordinary everyday decision making. Risk is standardly understood in a probabilistic way, on which the risk of a given outcome is connected with the probability that the outcome will occur. In some recent philosophical literature, however, the dominance of this probabilistic approach has been challenged, and certain non-probabilistic conceptions of risk have been proposed. This literature will serve the starting point for this course, but we will go on to consider a much broader range of literature ¿ drawing upon sources in psychology, risk management and legal theory. Specific topics to be covered will vary from year to year but may include the ethics of risk imposition, risk-taking in extreme sport, the legal distinction between attacks and endangerments and whether there is such a thing as a ¿de minimis risk¿ ¿ a risk that is so small that it can be rationally ignored. |
Course description |
The notion of risk is central to areas such as economics, finance, medicine and law as well as branches of philosophy such as ethics and epistemology. It is also a prominent part of ordinary everyday decision making. Risk is standardly understood in a probabilistic way, on which the risk of a given outcome is connected with the probability that the outcome will occur. In some recent philosophical literature, however, the dominance of this probabilistic approach has been challenged, and certain non-probabilistic conceptions of risk have been proposed. This literature will serve the starting point for this course, but we will go on to consider a much broader range of literature ¿ drawing upon sources in psychology, risk management and legal theory. Specific topics to be covered will vary from year to year but may include the ethics of risk imposition, risk-taking in extreme sport, the legal distinction between attacks and endangerments and whether there is such a thing as a ¿de minimis risk¿ ¿ a risk that is so small that it can be rationally ignored.
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Information for Visiting Students
Pre-requisites | Visiting students should have completed at least 3 Philosophy courses at grade B or above. We will only consider University/College level courses. Applicants should note that, as with other popular courses, meeting the minimum does NOT guarantee admission. These enrolments are managed strictly by the Visiting Student Office, in line with the quotas allocated by the department, and all enquiries to enrol in these courses must be made through the CAHSS Visiting Student Office. It is not appropriate for students to contact the department directly to request additional spaces. |
High Demand Course? |
Yes |
Course Delivery Information
Not being delivered |
Learning Outcomes
On completion of this course, the student will be able to:
- Understand the differences between a number of different accounts of risk proposed in the recent philosophical literature.
- Apply their understanding of different conceptions of risk to a range of problems in epistemology, ethics, law and risk management.
- Critically evaluate different views about the nature of risk, the ethics of risk imposition and other related areas.
- Analyse and discuss difficult and challenging topics with greater clarity, rigour and structural transparency.
- Improve core skills, including their ability to interpret and engage with academic texts, to evaluate arguments, and to develop their own ideas.
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Reading List
The reading list is likely to vary from year to year depending on the topics to be covered, but the following is indicative of the kinds of sources that will be used:
Boholm, Max, Niklas Möller, and Sven Ove Hansson. (2016) "The concepts of risk, safety and security: Applications in everyday language." Risk Analysis, 36(2), 320-338.
Bricker, Adam M. (2018) "Do judgements about risk track modal ordering?" Thought 7(3), 200-208.
Comar, Cyril. L. (1979). "Risk: a pragmatic de minimis approach." Science, 203(4378), 319.
Duff, Antony and Tatjana Hörnle (forthcoming) 'Crimes of endangerment'
Ebert, Philip, Martin Smith and Ian Durbach (2020) 'Varieties of risk' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101(2), 432-455
Ellsberg, Daniel (1961). "Risk, ambiguity axioms, and the Savage axioms." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 643-669.
Finkelstein, Claire (2003) 'Is risk a harm?' University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151(3), 963-1001
Finucane, Melissa. L., Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic, and Stephen M. Johnson. (2000). "The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits." Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13, 1-17.
Fratantonio, Giada (2021) 'Evidence, risk and proof paradoxes: Pessimism about the epistemic project' International Journal of Evidence and Proof 25, 307-325
Gärdenfors, Peter and Nils-Eric Sahlin. (1982). "Unreliable probabilities, risk taking and decision making", Synthese, 53, 361-386.
Gardiner, Georgi (2021) 'Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk' (2021) Synthese 199, 481-511
Gigerenzer, Gerd. (1991). "How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond 'heuristics and biases'." In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European Review of Social Psychology. Chichester, England: Wiley. 83-115.
Gigerenzer, Gerd and David J. Murray. (1987). Cognition as Intuitive Statistics. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Goldsmith, Robert W. and Nils-Eric Sahlin. (1983). "Second-order probabilities and risk in decision making", Advances in Psychology, 14, 455-467.
Hansson, Sven Ove (2013) The Ethics of Risk: Ethical Analysis in an Uncertain World Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Hayenhjelm, Madeleine and Jonathan Wolff (2012) 'The moral problem of risk impositions: A survey' European Journal of Philosophy 20, e26-e51
Hubbard, Douglas. W. (2009). The Failure of Risk Management. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
Kahneman, Daniel. (2011). Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. (1979). "Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk", Econometrica. 47(2), 263-292.
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. (1974). "Simulation heuristic", In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (Eds), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 201-208.
Knight, Frank. H. (1921). Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Boston, MA: Hart, Schaffner & Marx; Houghton Mifflin Company.
Koehler, Derek. (1991). "Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment." Psychological Bulletin, 110(3), 499-513.
Loewenstein, George., Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. Hsee, and Ned Welch. (2001). "Risk as feeling." Psychological Bulletin, 127(2), 267-286.
Lundgren, Björn and H. Orri Stefánsson (2020) 'Against the de minimis principle' Risk Analysis 40(5), 908-914
McCarthy, David (1997) 'Rights, explanation and risks' Ethics 107(2), 205-225
Mumpower, Jeryl. (1986). "An Analysis of the de minimis strategy for risk management", Risk Analysis, 6(4), 437-446.
Oberdiek, John (2012) 'The moral significance of risking' Legal Theory 18(3), 339-356
Peterson, Martin. (2002). "What is a de minimis risk?" Risk Management, 4(2), 47-55.
Pennington, Nancy and Reid Hastie. (1991) "A cognitive theory of juror decision making: The story model." Cardozo Law Review 13, 519-557.
Pritchard, Duncan. (2015). "Risk." Metaphilosophy, 46(3), 436-461.
Pritchard, Duncan. (2016). "Epistemic risk" Journal of Philosophy, 113(11), 550-571.
Schwarz, Norbert and Leigh Ann Vaughn. (2002). "The availability heuristic revisited: Ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources of information." In T Gilovich, D. Griffin, D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. New York: Cambridge University Press. 103-119.
Slovic, Paul, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein. (1980). "Facts and fears: Understanding perceived risk." In R.C. Schwin & W.A. Albers (Eds), Societal Risk Assessment: How safe is safe enough? New York: Plenum Press. 181-212.
Slovic, Paul, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein. (1980). "The psychometric study of risk perception." In V.T. Covello, J. Menkes & J. Mumpower (Eds.), Risk evaluation and management. New York: Plenum Press. 3-24.
Slovic, Paul, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald G. MacGregor. (2002). "The affect heuristic." In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. New York: Cambridge University Press. 397-420.
Slovic, Paul, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters, Donald G. MacGregor. (2004). "Risk as analysis and risk as feelings: Some thoughts about affect, reason, risk and rationality." Risk Analysis, 24(2), 311-322.
Smith, Martin (2016) Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief Oxford: Oxford University Press
Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1983) 'Some questions about government regulation of behavior' in Machan, T. and Johnson, M. eds. Rights and Regulation: Ethical, Political and Economic Issues Cambridge, MA: Ballinger
Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1983) 'Imposing risks' in Gibson, M. ed. To Breathe Freely: Risk Consent and Air Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld
Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1990) The Realm of Rights Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
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Additional Information
Graduate Attributes and Skills |
Not entered |
Keywords | Not entered |
Contacts
Course organiser | Dr Martin Smith
Tel: (0131 6)50 3654
Email: |
Course secretary | Ms Veronica Vivi
Tel:
Email: |
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