Undergraduate Course: Economics of Strategic Behaviour (ECNM10013)
Course Outline
| School | School of Economics |
College | College of Humanities and Social Science |
| Course type | Standard |
Availability | Available to all students |
| Credit level (Normal year taken) | SCQF Level 10 (Year 4 Undergraduate) |
Credits | 40 |
| Home subject area | Economics |
Other subject area | None |
| Course website |
None |
Taught in Gaelic? | No |
| Course description | This course is about economic decisions that involve conflict and interdependency in an essential way. Situations in which what one person, or firm, or government does affects the opportunities, profits, and welfare of others, and vice versa, are ubiquitous in the real world e.g., bidding for a house, negotiating a wage rise, introducing a new product, setting macroeconomic targets. New insights have been gained into these problems by the application of game theory. This can be defined as the study of models of conflict, and cooperation, between rational decision-makers who know what they want and do their best to get it. |
Information for Visiting Students
| Pre-requisites | None |
| Displayed in Visiting Students Prospectus? | Yes |
Course Delivery Information
|
| Delivery period: 2012/13 Full Year, Available to all students (SV1)
|
Learn enabled: Yes |
Quota: None |
| Location |
Activity |
Description |
Weeks |
Monday |
Tuesday |
Wednesday |
Thursday |
Friday |
| Central | Lecture | 2.13 Geography Building, Infirmary Street | 1-22 | | | 09:00 - 10:50 | | |
| First Class |
First class information not currently available |
| Exam Information |
| Exam Diet |
Paper Name |
Hours:Minutes |
|
|
| Main Exam Diet S2 (April/May) | | 3:00 | | |
Summary of Intended Learning Outcomes
| Having taken the course students will be able to understand: the main solution concepts in modern game theory; the importance of information in strategic situations; the importance of timing, commitment and credibility; why cooperation and collusion might (or might not) occur in situations involving conflict and interdependency; the role of dynamic games of complete and incomplete information; problems with game theory; evolutionary game theory; learning models. |
Assessment Information
| A 3 hour degree exam in May/June (70%) and two take home problem sets (one per semester) each contributing 15% to the final grade. |
Special Arrangements
| None |
Additional Information
| Academic description |
Not entered |
| Syllabus |
Not entered |
| Transferable skills |
Not entered |
| Reading list |
Not entered |
| Study Abroad |
Not entered |
| Study Pattern |
Not entered |
| Keywords | Not entered |
Contacts
| Course organiser | Prof Jozsef Sakovics
Tel: (0131 6)50 3840
Email: Jozsef.Sakovics@ed.ac.uk |
Course secretary | Ms Eirlys Armstrong
Tel: (0131 6)50 8361
Email: eirlys.armstrong@ed.ac.uk |
|
© Copyright 2012 The University of Edinburgh - 31 August 2012 3:50 am
|
University Homepage